INTRODUCTION
You are enjoying a quiet evening at home in Michigan when you receive a phone call. An unfamiliar voice says, "I know where you live, and I'm coming to kill you." Upset by this incident, you report it to the police. A short time later the police tell you that they have traced the call and identified the perpetrator: a patient confined to a mental hospital in Hawaii, who apparently called your number either by mistake or at random. The police inform you that even though the threatener is already committed to a psychiatric facility, they intend to prosecute him for the crime of making threats. 1 Does this threat constitute a "violent" crime?
If not, what if the threatener had turned out to be a disgruntled former employee of your company, twice convicted of committing violent crimes, who lived nearby? In other words, is the answer influenced by the apparent likelihood -or lack thereof -of the threat being carried out? If the Hawaii mental patient's threat is a "violent" crime, does this mean that a statement of intent to do something "violent" is always an act "of violence"?
It is important to think about the answers to these questions because, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines ),2 the characterization of a crime as "violent" or "non-violent" is significant for a defendant in two ways. First, if a crime is consid- 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992) (looking to 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982) for guidance even though the instant case was brought under § 879). Consequently, when this Note refers to "punishable threats," the particular statute under which the threats would be punished is not important.
2. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1994) . Federal courts are required to impose sentences within the range stipulated by the Guidelines for a particular crime, except when unusual aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present. See 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b) (1994) .
At the time this issue of the Michigan Law Review went to press -January 1996 -the revised Guidelines Manual from November 1994 was the latest available edition. The Sentencing Commission customarily revises the Guidelines every November, but the November 1995 revisions were not yet available.
1067 [Vol. 94:1067 ered a "non-violent offense" and the defendant committed it while suffering from "reduced mental capacity," he may be entitled to a sentence reduction under section 5K2.13 (the "reduced mental capacity provision") of the Guidelines.3 Second, if a crime is considered a "crime of violence" and the defendant previously has been convicted of two other "crimes of violence," he may be considered a "career offender" under section 4Bl.1 (the "career offender provision") and receive a more severe sentence than he otherwise would. 4 Thus, the violent or non-violent nature of an offense may have substantial impact on the length of a defendant's sentence.
Characterization of an offense as "violent" or "non-violent" can be difficult, 5 especially with respect to threats, 6 which do not seem to fall squarely within either the violent or non-violent category of 3 . See USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. As a general matter, the Guidelines prescribe sentences based on the nature of the offense committed and the defendant's criminal history, see USSG § lBl.1, and the mental or emotional state of the defendant is not a consideration, see USSG § 5Hl.3, p.s. The reduced mental capacity provision is an exception to this approach. It states:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. Section 5K2.13 does not provide a definition or a cross-reference for the term non-violent offense. There is also no definition provided for the term reduced mental capacity, but this omission does not seem to have created as much controversy.
4. USSG § 4Bl.1. Section 4Bl.1 effectuates the congressional desire that "career" offenders be sentenced" 'at or near the maximum term authorized.'" USSG § 4Bl.1, comment. (backg'd.) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994) . Hence, a defendant is likely to receive a very severe sentence if he qualifies as a career offender.
Career offenders are criminals who have committed either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and previously have been convicted of two other such crimes. USSG § 4Bl.1. Both of these terms are defined in USSG § 4Bl.2. The meaning and significance of the crime of violence definition are discussed at length infra section III.C. The definition of controlled substance offense is not relevant to this Note.
Judges and professors alike have noted the difficulty of assigning meaning to the term
violence. For instance, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), the majority held that voir dire questions regarding racial prejudice are permitted when the crime involved was a "violent crime." Justice Rehnquist responded to this holding by commenting that "knowing the contentiousness of our profession, the suggestion that a precise definition of 'violent crime' ... will ever be arrived at leaves me unwilling to lay down the flat rule . [T]he champions of various definitions are not even able to agree to differ, but are all evangelists in the cause of their own conception of violence. This disagreement has seemed so intractable and pointless to one philosopher that he has gone so far as to recommend that the word "violence" be abandoned altogether, as far too confused a notion for consistent use. crimes. Reflecting this difficulty, the federal courts of appeals have split regarding whether threats ever may be considered "nonviolent offenses" for purposes of deciding whether a defendant should be eligible for a sentence reduction under the reduced mental capacity provision. 7 Some say that whether an offense is "non-violent" depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and that consequently at least some threats may be considered "non-violent offenses." 8 Others look at the definition of "crime of violence" in the career offender provision, and, because this definition appears to characterize all threats as "crimes of violence," they conclude that threats should never be considered "nonviolent offenses."9
This Note argues that because the generally accepted legal meaning of violence is the use -or the risk of the use -of physical force so as to injure, damage, or abuse, threats only should be considered violent if they involve a risk of the use of physical force. Part I examines the substantive law of threats to determine if they inherently involve a risk of the use of physical force, and concludes that they do not. Part II studies the meaning of the term violence, and argues that both courts and dictionaries understand the term to mean the use -or the risk of the use -of physical force so as to injure, damage, or abuse. Part ill then draws on the analysis of Parts I and II and concludes that courts should consider threats violent offenses only when they involve the risk of the use of force; riskless threats should qualify as "non-violent offenses" under the reduced mental capacity provision and should not be considered "crimes of violence" for purposes of the career offender provision.
7. Recall that offenders are not eligible for a sentence reduction under the reduced mental capacity provision unless their crime was a ''non-violent offense."
8. See United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with the district court's decision to consider the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine whether the defendant's offense was "non-violent"); United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) (looking at the facts and circumstance of the offense); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (considering all the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense). The Tenth Circuit also may endorse this view, though its analysis is difficult to follow. See United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that even though the defendant committed a "violent act," the trial judge properly "exercised his discretion not to depart downward" and that the judge "could consider the mental capacity" of the defendant (emphasis added)).
9. This approach thus involves "cross-applying" the crime of violence definition from the career offender provision to the reduced mental capacity provision. Finally, Part IV considers how courts should determine whether a threat created risk and argues that courts should consider a threat to have created risk -and therefore to be violent -whenever they find two facts: (1) the defendant had a genuine intent to carry out the threat, and (2) the defendant had the ability to carry out the threat.
I. THE HARM CAUSED BY THREATS
To begin to evaluate whether threats should always be considered violent crimes, it is necessary first to develop an understanding of the nature of criminal threats. The conduct involved in a threat is simple; all that is required is a communicated intent to kill or injure. 10 The harm caused by a threat, however, is more complicated and requires some analysis.
In theory, threats are capable of causing two types of harm: they can create fear in the recipient of the threat, and they can create a risk that the threatened conduct actually will take place. The Supreme Court has described the harms caused by threats as "the fear of violence . . . [and] the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." 11 In practice, however, courts eschew consideration of risk creation when determining whether a threat is criminal.12 All that is required is that the threat reasonably could have induced fear in the recipient. The fact that threats do not al-10. At the most general level, threats are simply statements of the speaker's present intention to do something in the future. Hence, the word threat includes both statements of intent to cause physical harm and statements of intent to do other unpleasant things -for example, one can threaten to go public with embarrassing information about a person or threaten to withhold one's business from a company that will not meet one's demands.
This Note uses the term threat to refer only to those threats that are encompassed by 18 U.S.C. § ••• § 871 was intended to prevent not simply attempts on the President's life, but also the harm associated with the threat itself'').
12. Courts' refusal to consider risk creation at the criminal-liability stage contrasts sharply with the central role that risk creation plays at the sentencing stage. At sentencing, the risk created by a threat is an important determinant of the length of the convicted threatener's sentence. For instance, the sentencing guideline that applies to threats specifically states that the "seriousness" of a threat "depends upon ... the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat." USSG § 2A6.1 comment. (backg'd.); see infra section III.A. But in deciding whether a threat is punishable at all, courts ignore risk creation and focus exclusively on fear creation. ways create risk raises serious questions regarding the propriety of categorically characterizing them as "violent crimes."13 Section I.A looks at federal threat cases and observes that federal courts are indifferent to whether a threatener had the intention or the ability to carry out his threat. Because these are the two most important indicators of whether a threat created any genuine risk of harm, this section concludes that the creation of risk is not an essential element of a punishable threat under existing law. Section I.B observes that federal courts regard fear as an essential element of a punishable threat because the creation of fear distinguishes "true threats" from nonpunishable jokes, hyperbole, and political speech.
A. The Irrelevance of Risk for Determining Criminal Liability
Notwithstanding the fact that the utterance of a threat theoretically creates a risk that the threatener will act in accordance with his stated intent, courts are indifferent to this risk when they decide whether or not a particular speech act is a punishable threat. Courts adamantly refuse to consider either of the two factors that could help them determine the degree of risk created by a threat: 14 the threatener's objective ability to carry out his threat and his subjective intent to carry out his threat.ls 13 conviction on the ground -among others -that his threat was conditional and equivocal. The court noted that there was some authority for the proposition that conditional statements were protected by the First Amendment. 2 B The court held, however, that "a threat is not to be construed as conditional if it had a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act in accordance with its tenor." The court then concluded that the people at the bank who had been the targets of Cox's threat "reasonably would be apprehensive" and "had reason to feel threatened." 2 9 Because Cox's threat created reasonable fear, his conviction was affirmed.
II. THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE
At sentencing, the Guidelines require courts to decide whether a criminal act was a non-violent offense or a crime of violence. These determinations govern the applicability of the reduced mental capacity and career offender provisions to the defendant. In order to decide whether a threat fits within the meaning of either of these formulations of the word violence, its meaning must first be ascertained. 30 Accordingly, this Part examines the meaning of violence as that term is used by dictionaries, courts, and statutes.
Section II.A argues that despite the theoretical debate about the meaning of violence, dictionaries, both lay and legal, and courts agree on a general definition: the use of physical force so as to injure, damage, or abuse. Section II.B demonstrates that courts have expanded the dictionary definition to include acts that create risk of the use of physical force because statutes defining the terms violent felony and crime of violence have focused on risk as a key determinant of whether an act was violent.
A. The General Definition of Violence
Dictionaries
Although it is customary for scholars writing about violence to bewail the lack of a precise definition of the word violence, 31 
How Courts Apply the Dictionary Definition
The dictionary definition of violence is obviously only a starting point. Lawyers and judges have long condemned overreliance on dictionaries in attempting to define legal terms. 36 Courts rarely are Violence is the nemesis of law-makers, for violence has a law of its own. Violence resists definition because it is protean, a thing of many forms .... Even when some definition is arrived at, violence evades the snares of law. The subtler, psychological forms of violence are difficult to place before the courts, requiring as they do some overt act; violence, for us, must be at least minimally apparent. On the other hand, it is hardly an irrational response to a lexical ambiguity to start by looking at the dictionary definition of the word in question. This approach has been en- confronted with a need to provide a definition for violence, so even though judicial opinions use the term with astonishing frequency,37 few cases explain what it means,38 When the courts do so, however, they have assigned it the same basic meaning as the dictionaries: the use of physical force so as to injure or abuse. 39 An example of a court that adhered rather strictly to the dictionary definition is Abernathy v. Conroy. 4 0 In Abernathy, the Fourth Circuit confronted a void-for-vagueness challenge to South Carolina's common law definition of riot. The common law defined a riot as " 'a tumultuous disturbance of the peace, by three or more persons assembled together ... putting their design into execution in a terrific and violent manner.' " 41 In response to the allegation that the reference to "violent" conduct was impermissibly vague, the court stated that " 'violence' is defined as the 'exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse,' " and asserted that the average citizen would understand the term violence in this way. 42 the Court's increasing use of dictionaries and observing that dictionary definitions were used in 28% of the cases decided by the Court during its 1992 Term).
37. A search in the ALLFEDS database on Westlaw reveals that in the first six months of 1995, 19,098 cases used the words violence or violent, excluding uses of the terms of art "crime of violence" and "violent felony"; the search terms for this were: violenl % "crime of violence" % "violent felony" and da(aft 1-1-95) and da(bef 7-1-95). 44 the court had to evaluate the conduct of a defendant who had punched his court-appointed counsel, knocking him to the floor. 45 The court commented: "Having decided that the use of physical force within the walls of the courthouse simply is unacceptable, the question remains how to react to the use of violence .... "46 These statements do not prove conclusively that violence is limited to the use of physical force or the risk thereof, but they do reveal that courts, like the dictionaries, think of violence as directly related to physical force. 48. In a sense, the inclusion of risk creation within the meaning of violence is implicit in the more general definition as well. All of the dictionary definitions discussed supra emphasize the link between the actor's conduct and the harmful outcome -the conduct must be undertaken "so as" to cause injury or damage. This linkage provides some justification for considering risk-creating conduct, which has a tendency to result in injury or damage, as within the scope of the term violence. [Vol. 94:1067 The ACCA and the career offender provision are both designed to impose particularly severe penalties on certain classes of criminals: the ACCA focuses on those who committed violent felonies while armed, 4 9 while the career offender provision applies more generally to anyone convicted of three crimes of violence.so The definitions of these two terms are nearly identical, and both expressly include "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 51 In light of these definitions, courts consider various crimes to be violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA or crimes of violence for purposes of the career offender provision, if they involve physical force or the risk thereof. 52 A circuit split that arose regarding the status of attempted burglary as a
B. Risk Creation as a Type of Violence
The inclusion of risk creation within the meaning of violence also prevents some conceptual absurdities. If risk creation were not included, for instance, the placement of a bomb in a public place would not be a violent act if the bomb were detected and disarmed before it exploded -there would have been no use of physical force. The bomber's conduct, however, is the same whether the bomb is detected and disarmed or whether it explodes with great physical force. It makes little sense to classify his attempted bombing as "non-violent" simply because it was unsuccessful. Similarly, if a threat creates risk of the use of force but does not result in any force actually being used, the risk itself may be enough to characterize the threat as "violent."
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1994) (prohibiting courts from suspending sentences or granting probation to offenders with three previous convictions for "violent felonies" and setting 15-years imprisonment as the minimum sentence for such offenders). 153 (1995); United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopting an earlier hold· ing "that attempted breaking and entering under Maryland law qualified as a violent felony because the risk of confrontation, and physical harm, created when someone interrupts an intruder in the process of breaking in is nearly as great as the risk created when an interruption occurs after access is gained"), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994); United States v. King, 979 F.2d 801, 804 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a conspiracy to commit armed robbery is not a "violent felony" because, unlike a completed armed robbery, conspiracy does " 'not necessarily present circumstances which [create a] high risk of violent confrontation'" (quoting United States v. Strahl, 969 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Payne, 966 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that attempted breaking and entering is a "violent felony" because "the defendant will have [to] come close enough to someone else's premises to risk a confrontation likely to result in violence"); and United States v. Martinez, 954 F.2d 1050, 1054 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" because "the crime of attempted burglary simply cannot be said to present the sort of categorical danger of serious risk of injury to others that is required to count an offense as a 'violent felony' ").
With respect to the career offender provision, see, for example, United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir.) (holding that drunk driving is a "crime of violence" because it inherently creates a risk of physical injury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 323 (1995); United States v. Weinert, 1 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that shooting at a dwelling is a "crime of violence" because it presents a risk); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that robbery is a "crime of violence" because it presents a risk), cert denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991).
"violent felony" under the ACCA is illustrative in this regard. Although the circuits came to different results, they both analyzed the issue in terms of whether the crime created risk of the use of physical force and injury to others.53
III. THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE IN THE REDUCED MENTAL CAPACITY AND CAREER OFFENDER PROVISIONS
Under the definition of violence favored by both the courts and the dictionaries -the use or risk of the use of physical force so as to injure, damage, or abuse 54 -it is clear that not all threats are violent because threats do not involve physical force, 55 and some threats do not even create risk of the use of physical force.56 This Part considers whether this understanding of when threats are violent should be applied to the reduced mental capacity and career offender provisions. Section III.A argues that it is desirable to distinguish risk-creating threats from riskless threats when deciding whether they are violent for sentencing purposes. Risk-creating threats cause a different and greater harm than riskless threats, so it makes sense to impose greater punishment on those making riskcreating threats. Section III.B contends that the language and purposes of the reduced mental capacity provision indicate that courts should consider riskless threats "non-violent offenses." Section III.C asserts that the career offender provision's definition of "crime of violence" should be understood to exclude riskless threats because the provision was designed to include crimes that inherently create risk of the use of physical force, and threats do not inherently create such risk.
A. The Desirability of Distinguishing Between Risk-Creating and
Riskless Threats Characterizing riskless threats as "non-violent" and riskcreating threats as "violent" is not just a matter of definitional accuracy. It also achieves the Guidelines's goal of prescribing different punishments for crimes that result in different harms. 57 Threats are 53. Compare Thomas, 2 F.3d at 80 {holding that attempted burglary is a "violent felony" because it creates a risk of physical harm) with Martinez, 954 F.2d at 1054 n.3 {holding that attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" because it does not present a serious risk of injury).
54. See supra Part II. 55. Threats are speech acts, which in themselves involve no use of force. See supra note 6.
56. See supra Part I. 57. See, e.g., USSG § 1Bl.3{a){3) (stating that the "relevant conduct" for purposes of deciding the base offense level for a crime includes "all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions ••• and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions").
The Guidelines also refer to the objective of tailoring the punishment of crimes to the degree of harm caused by reference to the more general goal of "proportionality." See, e.g., (Vol. 94:1067 punishable because, irrespective of risk creation, they cause a harm that society desires to prevent: fear. 58 Sometimes, but not always, threats also cause a second harm -risk of the use of physical force. Consequently, a definition of violence that enables courts to impose different sentences on these two classes of threats -those that are merely frightening and those that are both frightening and riskyis desirable because the latter causes a different and greater harm.59
Furthermore, the Guidelines specifically recognize that different degrees of risk creation are important in imposing sentences on threateners. In section 2A6.1, which prescribes sentences for "Threatening Communications," the Commission commented: "[Threat] statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends upon the defendant's intent and the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat."60
B. The Reduced Mental Capacity Provision
The reduced mental capacity provision permits a court to grant a sentence reduction to a defendant suffering from reduced mental capacity only if the defendant committed a "non-violent offense."6 1 The Guidelines do not provide a definition for the term "non-USSG Ch.1, Pt.A (3), p.s. ("Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.").
Achieving proportionality in criminal sentences is not discretionary: it is constitutionally mandated. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The Eighth Amendment declares: 'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' The final clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.").
58. See supra section J.B. The harm of fear creation encompasses a number of related harms, such as illnesses that may be caused by anxiety, and the cost of inefficient behavior that threat recipients engage in as a response to a threat. See Steven Shaven, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmai~ Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877 (1993) (describing the anxiety and inefficient conduct that threats induce). For example, a threat recipient might become clinically depressed as a result of prolonged anxiety or might quit his job if the threat related to his workplace conduct. These kinds of harms -in addition to simple anxiety -are among those that we seek to prevent by criminalizing threats.
59 violent offense," which seems to suggest that the term should be given its ordinary legal meaning6 2 -an offense not involving the use or risk of the use of force. 63 This interpretation is reinforced by other language in the provision denying sentence reductions to defendants whose criminal histories "indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. "64 The decision to include this limitation indicates that the reduced mental capacity provision as a whole is concerned about risk presented by the defendant. Defendants whose past offenses demonstrate risk creation are barred from sentence reductions by the "criminal history" limitation. Defendants whose instant offenses involved risk are denied sentence reductions based on the "non-violent offense" requirement. Understood in this way, the two provisions work toward a common goal, and the reduced mental capacity provision sends a consistent message: leniency is appropriate when a person committed a crime while suffering from reduced mental capacity but did not create any real risk to anyone. 65 Under this approach, therefore, a riskless threat should qualify as a "non-violent offense."
The only reason that has been suggested for understanding nonviolent offense to have other than its customary legal meaning is that the Guidelines provide a definition for "crime of violence" in the career offender provision. Some courts have decided that because both terms contain the same root word -violence -a "nonviolent offense" should be understood as anything that is not a crime of violence.66 Because courts generally assume that all threats to use physical force are crimes of violence,67 cross-applying the crime of violence definition to the reduced mental capacity provision would mean that a threat never could be considered a nonviolent offense. This cross-application of the crime of violence definition, however, is inappropriate in light of the structure and text of the Guidelines and the different policy goals of the two provisions.
First, the structure and text of the Guidelines suggest that the Sentencing Commission's decision to use different terms in the two provisions means that different meanings were intended.68 At the beginning of the Guidelines, the Commission specifies some definitions that it intends to have "general applicability."69 The crime of violence definition is not among these. The Guidelines then provide explicit cautionary language regarding the cross-application of other definitions that were not designated for "general applicability": "Definitions of terms also may appear in other sections. Such definitions are not designed for general applicability; therefore, their applicability to sections other than those expressly referenced must be determined on a case by case basis." 7 0 This language seems to place the burden of persuasion squarely upon those who advocate the cross-application of a definition in an instance where the Sentencing Commission has declined to do so. The assumption that all threats are crimes of violence arises from the language of the crime of violence definition, which appears to include "any offense ••. that has as an element the ... threatened use of physical force." USSG § 4Bl.2(1). This Note challenges this assumption infra in section III.C.
68. Cf. Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (concluding that Congress's decision to use different wording in two "simultaneously adopted" subsections of an act reflects an intent to convey different meanings).
In an ordinary statute, one might argue that Congress's choice of slightly different formulations is indicative of mere oversight rather than a deliberate distinction. But as the Chatman court observes, the Guidelines " 'were written as a unit •.. and with greater than 
The dissent in Poff employed similar reasoning:
It would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to say that the judge may depart unless the defendant committed a 'crime of violence' as § 4Bl.2 defines it; instead the Commission Second, the policy goals of the career offender and reduced mental capacity provisions are different, suggesting that crossapplication of the crime of violence definition to the reduced mental capacity provision is inappropriate. The career offender provision gives effect to the congressional mandate that career offenders be punished harshly -that their sentences be "at or near the maximum term authorized" by statute.1 2 Moreover, this provision is an essential part of the sentencing process. The sentencing court must consider whether the defendant qualifies as a career offender when imposing a sentence. 73 The reduced mental capacity provision, by contrast, seeks to enable courts to give more lenient sentences to defendants who suffered from reduced mental capacity during the commission of their offense. 74 It is also a purely discretionary provision: courts may refuse to consider it if they so desire. 75 Thus, the differences between the career offender and reduced mental capacity provisions encompass both distinctive policy objectives and distinctive usage by courts. These differences outweigh the mere fact that cognates of the word violence are used in both provisions and render cross-application of the crime of violence definition to the reduced mental capacity provision inappropriate.76 selected different formulations. Although it laid out a detailed meaning for 'crime of violence' in § 4Bl.2, it did not provide so much as a cross-reference in § 5K2.13, a curious omission if the Commission meant to link these phrases so tightly that they are mutually exclusive. 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). This reasoning was adopted by Chatman. See 986 F.2d at 1450 (quoting the above passage and further stating: "The lack of a crossreference is all the more significant because so many of the Guidelines use explicit crossreferencing. For instance, the definition of 'crime of violence' in section 4Bl.2 is expressly adopted by section 4Al.1 .... "). 74. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 ("In contrast to the purposes of section 4Bl.2, the point of section 5K2.13 is to treat with lenity those individuals whose 'reduced mental capacity' contributed to commission of a crime."); cf. Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting) (stating that "[s]ection 5K2.13 read as a whole ..• says that when incapacitation is not an important justification for punishment, mental condition may be the basis of a departure").
75. The introduction to the chapter in which the reduced mental capacity provision is found states: "[T]his subpart seeks to aid the court by identifying some of the factors that the Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines ....
Presence of any such factor may warrant departure from the guidelines ... in the discretion of the sentencing court." USSG Even if one does not accept the argument presented in this section, J;iowever, and chooses to cross-apply the crime of violence definition to the reduced mental capacity provision, the next section demonstrates that not all threats are crimes of violence. Consequently, regardless of which definition of violence one prefersthe ordinary legal definition or the crime of violence definitionat least some threats should qualify as non-violent offenses.
C. The Career Offender Provision
Courts that disagree with the argument presented in section III.B and hold that threats cannot be non-violent offenses generally do so based on two premises: (1) they believe that the definition of crime of violence controls the meaning of non-violent offense, and (2) they believe that all threats are crimes of violence, and therefore no threat can be a non-violent offense. 77 Even if one accepts the first premise -in spite of the arguments presented in section III.B -this section contends that the second premise is erroneous.
This section argues that the crime of violence definition should be understood to exclude riskless threats because risk of physical harm is an essential element of crimes of violence. This section demonstrates the centrality of risk of physical harm to the crime of violence definition 78 by examining the language of the definition, its history, and the interpretation of the definition by courts. Section 4B1.2 defines crime of violence as follows:
The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state law ... that -(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 79 One reasonably could argue, based on a simple examination of the language of section (i) fender provision to threat offenses generally have assumed, without much analysis, that this interpretation is correct and that therefore all threats to use physical force are crimes of violence. 8 1 Despite the apparent plausibility of this "plain language" approach, the language of the definition as a whole, its legislative history, and the way in which courts have interpreted the definition indicate that the better understanding is that the definition only includes crimes that inherently involve risk. 82 The language of the "otherwise" clause in section (ii) provides insight into what the drafters were trying to accomplish in the crime of violence definition. Although the "otherwise" clause is attached to section (ii) and therefore does not directly control section (i), statutory language should be read in the context of the entire statute in which it is found,8 3 so the "otherwise" clause is relevant to understanding the meaning of section (i) as well.84
The "otherwise" clause provides a guide to what the drafters sought to accomplish by enumerating specific offenses in section (ii): it indicates that they were listing offenses that they felt created a serious potential risk of physical injury. The presence of the phrase "or otherwise involves ... serious potential risk" reflects the drafters' belief that the specific offenses listed in section (ii) were all examples of offenses involving serious potential risk. The list of specific offenses in section (ii), in turn, is simply a continuation of the project started in section (i), which was to identify categories of crimes that generally involve risk. 85 The "otherwise" clause and the •.• The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if possible be read to conform to the spirit of the act").
83. See 2A SINGER, supra note 62, § 46.05, at 103 ("An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascribed from the context ... and the purpose or intention ••. of the body which enacted or framed the statute .... "); id. at 105 (referring to "the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control"). 85. This is demonstrated by the fact that the two sections are disjunctive: if an offense does not qualify as a crime of violence under § (i), the sentencing court then considers list of specific offenses in section (ii) demonstrate the drafters' desire to ensure that all other crimes involving serious potential risk that section (i) overlooked still will qualify as crimes of violence.
That the "otherwise" clause indicates the statute's intent to encompass crimes that create a risk of physical injury is supported by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Taylor v. United States. 8 6 In Taylor, the Court analyzed the purpose of the crime of violence definition87 as a prelude to determining the meaning of the term burglary. The Court first quoted a passage from the legislative history of the provision indicative of the importance of risk of injury to the drafters: "The ... major question involved in these hearings was as to what violent felonies involving physical force against property should be included in the definition .... The Subcommittee agreed to add the crimes ... that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to others." 8 8 The Court then described the addition of the word "otherwise" -along with the newly enumerated specific offenses -as "critical" to its discussion of the definition, 89 and concluded that "Congress focused its efforts on career offenders -those who . . . present at least a potential threat of harm to persons."90 Moreover, the Taylor Court's analysis demonstrates that the drafters of the crime of violence definition did not merely seek to include crimes that might involve a risk of the use of physical force; rather, they sought to include in the definition those crimes that inherently create such risk. The Court noted in its analysis of the legislative history of the provision that an unenacted predecessor of the current definition explicitly had indicated the drafters' desire to include inherently risk-creating crimes. The predecessor statute had included any felony "that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used."91 When an alternative bill was introduced that omitted language of this kind -it included only "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" -it was criticized sharply for whether it might still qualify as one of the specific offenses listed in § (ii). If this fails, the court may then consider whether the crime "otherwise involved" risk of physical injury.
86. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). omitting inherently risky property offenses. 92 One critic asserted that "[i]t is these crimes against property -which are inherently dangerous -that we think should be considered as predicate offenses."93 Based on this legislative background -and Congress's ultimate decision to include inherently dangerous offenses and the "otherwise" clause -the Taylor Court concluded: .
[T]hroughout the history of the enhancement provision, Congress focused its efforts on career offenders -those who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood, and who ... present at least a potential threat of harm to persons .... The legislative history also indicates that Congress singled out burglary ... for inclusion as a predicate offense ... because of its inherent potential for harm to persons .... Congress apparently thought that all burglaries ... shared this potential for violence .... 94 The lower courts that addressed the status of burglary prior to Taylor likewise focused on the inherent nature of the risk created by the crime, 95 and courts have applied this focus to other crimes as well when deciding whether they should be considered crimes of violence.96 (holding that burglary of a dwelling is a "crime of violence" because "[w]henever a private residence is broken into, there is always a substantial risk that force will be used" (emphasis added)). The Sentencing Commission clearly believes that the crime of violence definition is intended to encompass inherently risk-creating offenses. In its commentary to the career offender provision, the Commission expressly identified some crimes as crimes of violence, such as murder, manslaughter, and aggravated assault.97 The Commission then echoed the language of the unenacted predecessor definition of crime of violence discussed in Taylor, stating: "Other offenses are included where ... the conduct set forth (i.e. expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted ... by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of injury to another."98
Given that the crime of violence definition seeks to encompass offenses that inherently involve a serious risk of the use of physical force, it would thwart this objective to interpret the definition to include all threats because threats do not inherently involve risk of the use of physical force.99 The intent of the crime of violence provision would be served best if courts only applied it to those threats that create "a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." To apply the definition to every threatened use of physical force, risk-creating or not, extends the statute beyond its intended scope.10° 166 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The Sentencing Commission has thus determined that certain crimesregardless of the precise conduct -are inherently violent." (emphasis added)).
97. See USSG § 4B1.2, comment. (n.2).
98. USSG § 4B12, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). Threats are notably absent from the Commission's list of crimes of violence, though the Commentary also repeats the passage in the text of the career offender provision stating that crimes that have as an element the "threatened use of physical force" are crimes of violence.
99. See supra Part I. 100. Cf. 2B SINGER, supra note 62, § 54.06, at 260-61 ("When the natural or literal meaning of statutory language embraces applications which would not serve the policy or purpose for which the statute was enacted •.. the courts may construe it restrictively in order not to give it an effect beyond its equity or spirit.").
Singer cites as an example of this principle Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), in which the Court employed reasoning nearly identical to that advocated by this Note. In Holy Trinity, the Court was forced to construe a statute making it unlawful for any business to pay the expenses of a foreigner to come to the United States "to perform labor or service of any kind." 143 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added). The church had hired a minister from abroad to come and preach to its congregation but argued that it should be excepted from the reach of the Act. Confronted with the Government's argument that the statute on its face permitted no exceptions, the Court stated:
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers .
••. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation ..
• makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. This view of the scope of the crime of violence provision effectuates the goal of distinguishing risk-creating from riskless threats in imposing sentences for them. 1 0 1 Only risky threats deserve to be singled out for the particularly severe punishment imposed on crimes of violence 1 02 because only risky threats create the harm that the career offender provision seeks to punish -risk of physical injury. To insist that all threats be considered crimes of violence prevents the Guidelines from achieving their goal of calibrating punishments to the degree of harm caused by the crime.103
A more recent example of this approach is United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) . In Forman, the Court had to determine whether "stock" sold by a nonprofit housing cooperative qualified as a "security" for purposes of the federal securities laws. The Court first noted that the statutory language defined a "security" as " 'any note, stock, treasury stock •.. or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' . 103. Another way to make the argument asserted in this section is to say that the lesser degree of harm caused by riskless threats, as compared with risk-creating threats, was a mitigating factor "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S. Classifying Baskin as a career offender based on statutory characterizations of his previous crimes may be improper if an analysis of the facts demonstrates that they were not in fact crimes of violence . . . . A sentencing judge retains discretion to examine the facts of a predicate crime to determine whether it was a crime of violence .••. Obviously, the guidelines' definitions, commentary, and the like provide a solid starting point for determining whether a prior conviction was in fact a crime of violence. However, it may be appropriate, as provided by the guidelines, for a district judge to depart from the guidelines' statutory definition ... depending on the facts of the case. 886 F.2d at 389-90. Based on this reasoning, the Baskin court remanded the case to enable the trial court to determine whether the facts of the defendant's robbery justified a departure from the penalty enhancement stipulated by the career offender provision. See 886 F.2d at 390.
[Vol. 94:1067 IV. THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK Part Ill's argument that the status of a threat as violent or nonviolent depends on whether it created risk raises an obvious question: How should courts assess whether a threat created risk? The most obvious solution -for courts to examine in detail the conduct104 involved in the offense -has been forbidden explicitly by the Supreme Court in the ACCA context. 1 os Courts of appeals siinilarly have rejected a fact-specific, conduct-based inquiry in the context of the career offender provision. 106 But although it is iinpermissible to engage in elaborate factual investigations at the sentencing stage regarding the defendant's conduct, there are two ways courts may be able to assess risk created by a threat without violating this prohibition. First, the sentencing guideline applicable to threats explicitly requires courts to determine if a defendant intended to carry out his threat by examining conduct evidencing intent, so courts should make an exception to the prohibition when looking at conduct for this limited purpose. Second, courts can assess whether the defendant had the ability to carry out his threat by examining his personal characteristics and the nature of the situation in which the threat was made, thus avoiding any examination of the defendant's conduct.
This Part argues that courts should determine whether a threat created risk -and therefore was violent -by considering two factors: (1) whether the threatener had a genuine intent to carry out his threat and (2) whether he had the ability to carry out his threat. Section IV.A argues that these two factors are prerequisites for the creation of risk and that it is permissible for courts to consider these factors in sentencing threateners. Section IV.B contends that focusing on the defendant's "dangerousness" in order to assess risk, as several circuits have elected to do, is not as satisfactory an approach as considering the two factors suggested by this Note.
A. Intent and Ability as Risk Determinants
In order for there to be genuine risk created by a threat -in other words, a real possibility that the threat will be carried outit is clear that the threatener, at a minim.um, must have the intent to carry out the threat and the ability to do so. A threat that the speaker has no intention of carrying out may create fear in the recipient, 107 but it does not create risk that physical force actually will be used. For example, a person might threaten someone solely for the purpose of frightening them, with absolutely no intent to carry out the threat. In such a case, there is no risk that force actually will be used, even though the recipient of the threat may not know this at the time.
Inquiring into a threatener's intent to carry out his threat sometimes may require courts to look at conduct evidencing intent. 1 0 8 Although this may appear to be at odds with the general rule against considering specific conduct at the sentencing stage, an exception should be made for threats because the Sentencing Commission explicitly requires courts to consider conduct evidencing intent in section 2A6.1 -the sentencing guideline stipulating the punishment level for "Threatening Communications." 109 In section 2A6.1, the Commission establishes a "base offense level" 11 0 for threatening communications but then specifically provides for an increase in the defendant's sentence "[i]f the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat. " 111 Hence, a court imposing sentence on a defendant convicted of making threats is required to consider conduct evidencing intent even aside 107 110. The "base offense level" is the Commission's numerical indication of the seriousness of the crime. Once the base offense level for a crime is known, it may be subject to adjustment based on "specific offense characteristics" stipulated in the applicable guideline. See USSG § lBl.l(b). The sentence enhancement provided for threateners who engage in "conduct evidencing an intent to carry out [their] threat" is an example of a "specific offense characteristic." The defendant's sentence is determined by plugging his offense level -adjusted as necessary -and his criminal history category into a matrix provided in the Guidelines. See USSG Ch.5, Pt.A Sentencing Table. 111. USSG § 2A6.l(b)(l).
[Vol. 94:1067 from the need to assess risk. 112 Consequently, if courts consider this factor when deciding whether a threat was violent, no additional time or investigatory effort will be required.
The importance of the threatener's ability to carry out his threat is an even more fundamental indicator of risk than his intent to do so because, by definition, if the threatener is incapable of carrying out his threat, there is no risk that the threatened conduct actually will take place. For example, the defendant in United States v. Mitchell, 113 who threatened while in custody in Hawaii to drown President Reagan in the Atlantic Ocean, clearly did not have the capacity to carry out his threat, and thus there was no chance that the threatened conduct would occur.
The "Threatening Communications" sentencing guideline does not expressly require courts to consider the defendant's ability to carry out the threat, as it does with intent, but the propriety of such an inquiry is affirmed by the Sentencing Commission's commentary to section 2A6.1. The Commission stated: "These [threat] statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends on the defendant's intent and the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat. " 114 Given that the "likelihood" of a defendant carrying out his threat is a direct function of his ability to carry it out, this language is a strong invitation for courts to inquire into a defendant's ability at the sentencing stage.11s
The defendant's ability to carry out his threat can be measured by the characteristics of the defendant himself -and the nature of the situation -rather than by looking at the defendant's conduct. For example, a court considering the ability of a defendant to carry out a bomb threat might consider any number of characteristics of the defendant himself: his technical knowledge of bomb manufacturing, his prior criminal record, his psychiatric condition, his access 112. It is worth observing that this Note's approach imposes a sort of "multiple penalty" on threateners who have an intent to carry out their threat. Such intent would subject a threatener to the sentence enhancement required by § 2A6.l, expose him to potential liability under the career offender provision, and deny him access to the reduced mental capacity provision -provided, with respect to the latter two, that he also had the ability to carry out the threat. Given the risk posed by threateners who intend to carry out their threats, this enhancement of punishment seems justified. The Commission recognizes that this offense includes a particularly wide range of conduct and that it is not possible to include all of the potentially relevant circumstances in the offense level. Factors not incorporated in the guideline may be considered by the court in determining whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted. USSG § 2A6.1, comment. (n.1).
to explosive materials, and so on. The court also would consider situational variables such as the vulnerability of the target. Therefore, examining a defendant's ability to carry out his threat during sentencing is not barred by the proscription against inquiring into prior conduct because ability depends on the situation and the characteristics of the defendant himself, not his conduct in committing the offense.
B. The "Dangerousness" Approach
Several courts analyzing the reduced mental capacity provision have concluded that threats sometimes may qualify as non-violent offenses 11 6 and have held that "the term 'non-violent offense' in section 5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, in the act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous." 117 This approach finds support in the language of the reduced mental capacity provision 118 and has the desirable effect of permitting some threateners suffering from reduced mental capacity to obtain sentence reductions. This section argues that despite these virtues, focusing on the defendant's "dangerousness" in the abstract is not as effective in assessing risk as focusing specifically on his intent and ability to carry out the threat and suggests that "dangerousness" is not a characteristic that can be discerned reliably by courts.
Although the court in United States v. Chatman 119 -and the courts that have followed it -advocated focusing on the defendant's "dangerousness" as the key determinant of whether he committed a non-violent offense, this standard is not precise enough for courts to apply effectively. In itself, the instruction to look at "dangerousness" is extremely ambiguous: Does the court mean the defendant's current dangerousness, future dangerousness, or dangerousness at the time the act was committed? 120 121 In Weddle, the defendant sent his wife's lover -Angleberger -three letters: one threatened to "hunt [Angleberger] down and eliminate him from the picture"; the second stated, "You are going to pay for what you did"; and the third contained three bullets with Angleberger's name and address affixed to them. 122 Weddle also attempted to run Angleberger off the road and then chased him to his home and attempted to assault him with a "slapjack."123
Weddle was convicted of mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 and, at sentencing, sought a downward departure under section 5K2.13 on the grounds that he had suffered a "depressive episode" that led to "reduced mental capacity" during his commission of the offense. The court allowed the downward departure on the theory that the behavior was non-violent because it was "attributable to the depressive episode, and highly unlikely to be repeated" -in other words, because Weddle was not dangerous.124 Because the court believed Weddle was not dangerous, it determined that his offense was "non-violent" and granted him a sentence reduction under section 5K2.13.
Under the generally accepted legal definition of violencewhich considers the creation of risk of the use of physical force to constitute violence -it is clearly inappropriate to characterize Weddle's threats as "non-violent offenses." Based on his attempted assault on Angleberger, it was apparent that Weddle had both the intent and the ability to carry out his threats -in short, that he presented a real risk to Angleberger. His repeated threats demonstrate that his assault was not the product of a sudden emotional response, but rather was part of a calculated program by which Weddle hoped to intimidate Angleberger into ending his affair with Weddle's wife. The only explanation for the court's characterization of Weddle's threats as non-violent is that it was swayed unduly "non-violent" should depend on the defendant's present or future dangerousness. It is probably better, therefore, to read Chatman as requiring an assessment of the defendant's dangerousness at the time the act was committed. This would explain its statement that non-violent offenses are those that "in the act, reveal that the defendant is not dangerous." 986 F.2d at 1452 (emphasis added). But if this is what Chatman means, its use of the present tense -"the defendant is not dangerous" -is confusing.
121 by sympathy for Weddle: the court made reference to the fact that Weddle was a former police officer and that many members of the community had written letters attesting to his "exemplary" character.125 But these admirable qualities cannot overcome the simple fact that there was genuine risk that Weddle would carry out his threat. In applying the "dangerousness" test, the Weddle court lost sight of the risk created by Weddle's conduct, and thus mischaracterized his threats as non-violent. The opinion that created the "dangerousness" test -United States v. Chatman 126 -seems to recognize that the dangerousness test can be effective only if courts focus on the factors specified in this Note: the intent and ability of the threatener to carry out his threat. Chatman's guidance regarding application of the "dangerousness" test begins with the rather vague instruction to "consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime" in arriving at a determination of the defendant's dangerousness. 127 As Chatman discusses what particular facts and circumstances might be relevant, however, it becomes clear that what the court really considers important is the defendant's intent and ability to carry out his threat. This is revealed in Chatman's criticism of United States v. Poff, 1 28 where it states: "The Seventh Circuit held that a downward departure under section 5K2.13 was unavailable to the defendant .... On the record of the case, however, it appeared that the defendant neither intended nor was able to carry out her threats, suggesting that, in fact, her crime was a 'non-violent offense.' " 12 9 Thus, in spirit Chatman seems to favor an approach similar to that advocated by this Note. 130 But by vaguely characterizing its test as one of "dangerousness," the Chatman approach creates a possibility that courts will focus on facts that are not probative of the risk created by the defendant's threat.
Moreover, the Weddle case is not the only proof of the problems with an unstructured inquiry into dangerousness. A substantial body of psychiatric and social science research indicates that if courts attempt to engage in generalized estimates of defendants' dangerousness, they are unlikely to make accurate judgments. The experts in the dangerousness-prediction field send a surprising clear 125 130. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish between an inquiry designed to determine whether an act created "risk" and one to determine whether an act created "danger." The approach advocated by this Note, however, gives precise instructions for how to assess whether risk was created; the Chatman "dangerousness" test provides no such guidance, forcing courts to attempt ad hoc character assessments of defendants.
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Rarely have research data been as quickly or nearly universally accepted by the academic and professional communities as those supporting the proposition that mental health professionals are highly inaccurate at predicting violent behavior. We shall consider prediction research in detail in subsequent chapters, but the reader had best be forewarned that stock in the predictive enterprise is going very cheaply. 132 Another analyst surveyed a number of the empirical studies that attempted to assess the accuracy of dangerousness and violence predictions and concluded: "[W]e know ... that there has been no empirical demonstration by any profession . . . of accuracy in the prediction of violence in either the criminal justice or mental health system beyond that attainable by chance itself." 133 Pretrial-riskprediction studies indicate that assessments of dangerousness are correct "[a]t best ... one time out of three." 134 Although it is true that the criminal justice process already incorporates "dangerousness" assessments at several stages -pretrial detention decisions and involuntary commitment decisions being notable examples13S -this does not justify extending such a faulty analytical classifica-tion to other contexts. When the immediate safety of the public or the defendant himself is in jeopardy, it may be necessary for courts to make dangerousness estimates, but the sentencing of a convicted criminal presents no such exigency.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that threats should only be considered "violent" when they create risk and that the creation of risk should be determined by examining whether the threatener had the intent and ability to carry out his threat. As applied to the opening hypothetical, this approach means that the threat by the incarcerated mental patient in Hawaii should not be considered violent: even in the unlikely event that he had the intent to carry out his threat, he clearly did not have the ability to do so. Thus, although he couldand should -be punished for his crime of making threats, the mental patient should also be eligible for a reduced sentence based on his reduced mental capacity under section 5K2.13 because his offense was non-violent.
By contrast, the threat by the twice-convicted, disgruntled, former employee is a violent offense. His threat created risk because he had the intent to carry out his threat -if he was truly disgruntled -and, living nearby, he clearly had the ability to carry it out. Thus, his offense should qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of deciding if he is a career offender under section 4Bl.2, and he should not be eligible for a sentence reduction based on reduced mental capacity under section 5K2.13.
These divergent results demonstrate the importance of the conclusion that creation of risk is what makes a threat violent: people who make threats that create risk and fear should be sentenced more harshly than those whose threats create only fear. This can happen, however, only if the Sentencing Guidelines are interpreted in a manner that distinguishes the risky threats from the riskless. Failure to make this distinction impairs the ability of the justice system to sentence offenders in proportion to the degree of harm they caused. Because courts readily can determine if threats are violent by examining the intent and ability of threateners to carry out their threats, they should do so and reduce or increase offenders' sentences accordingly.
